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Arabia, Kuwait, and Venezuela) to benefit from
lower oil prices.
The chart also suggests that the recent behavior
of retail gasoline prices cannot be explained sim-
ply by a change in the relationship between
















Oil prices-then and now
In the past, retail prices of gasoline typically fol-
lowed the lead of crude oil prices. When crude
oil prices fell, a sizable proportionof this decline
tended to be passed through to retail prices. Of
course, changes in refinery technology, in-
creasing octane levels, and seasonal swings in
gasoline consumption, among other things,
caused the spread between the two prices to vary
from month to month, but, in general, the two
prices moved in the same direction. In contrast,
movements in the prices of oil and of gasoline
have diverged in 1988. Between February and
early October 1988, crude oil prices fell nearly
24 percent, while retail prices of unleaded gas-
oline actually rose. This behavior reflects a
fundamental change from that observed in pre-
vious years, as shown in Chart 1.
Some of this divergence between crude oil and
retail gasoline prices is the result of transitory
supply shocks. For example, a major fire caused
the closure of a Shell Oil refinery at the begin-
ning of the Summer. Moreover, hurricane damage
in the Gulf of Mexico exacerbated capacity prob-
lems and forced oil companies to import larger
volumes of more costly foreign gasoline.
Long-term trends in the industry's structure, how-
ever, also have contributed to the weakening link
between crude oil and gasoline prices. This Let-
ter focusses on some ofthese factors. The evi-
dence suggests that changes in the competitive
environment at the refinery level may make gas-
oline prices less sensitive to changes in crude oil
prices. In particular, total refinery capacity has
fallen in recent years. Moreover, a spate of merg-
ers and acquisitions within the industry has
decreased the number of producers and in-
creased the level of industry concentration.
These developments have effectively reduced
competition in the production of gasoline prod-
ucts. Reduced competition, in turn, insulates
gasoline prices from changes in crude oil prices,
allowing refiners to boost profit margins when
crude oil costs fall.
Before rebounding in the past few weeks, oil
prices dropped to their lowest levels since the
1986 price collapse during the first three quarters
of 1988. Despite the sharp drop in crude oil
prices, however, retail gasoline prices remained
steady or rose slightly, reflecting little of the
change in crude oil costs.
This change in the industry's competitive en-
vironment also means that profits of oil
companies with both crude oil and refining oper-
ations are less likely to rise and fall with crude
oil prices. In fact, the increased emphasis on
"downstream" operations (such as refining, re-
tailing, and petrochemical products) has made it
possible for oil companies and oil producing
countries with refining capacity (notably SaudiFRBSF
between retail and wholesale prices has in-
creased since 1985, that spread did not increase
appreciably in the last eighteen months. Instead,
the reduced passthrough in the current episode
of falling crude oil prices applies to wholesale
prices of gasoline, as well as to retail prices.
Statistical analysis ofthe relationship between
crude oil prices and the retail price of unleaded
gasoline confirms that the behavior of the
post-1987 market is significantly different from
that of prior years. In the period between 1983
and 1986, a 10 percent change in crude oil
prices led to a 5.5 percent change in retail un-
leaded gasoline prices. In contrast, in the 1987-
88 period, a similar change in crude oil prices
led to only a 1.7 percent change in the price of
retail unleaded gasoline.
Moreover, the estimates suggest a higher average
markup for unleaded gasoline at current crude oil
prices. In the pre-1987 period, a $15 crude oil
price eventually would yield a retail price for un-
leaded gasoline of 84 cents per gallon. In the
post-1987 market, the same price of crude oil
would yield a retail gasoline price of 94 cents
per gallon, a ten cent increase in margins.
Changes in refining capacity
Refiners' ability to set higher gasoline prices rela-
tive to crude oil prices largely is the result of
tightened supplies in the oil product market.
Since 1980, world oil refinery capacity has fallen
by 11 percent. Operable capacity in the United
States has fallen from nearly 19 million barrels
per day in 1981 to under 16 million barrels per
day this year.
This decline in refinery capacity is the result of
major changes in market conditions. One such
change was the deregulation of the oil market in
the United States, completed in early 1981. Prior
to deregulation, the method of allocating below-
market priced crude oil favored small refineries,
enabling them to compete with larger refineries
that enjoyed significant economies of scale and
operated at lower unit costs. Following the elim-
ination of these regulatory advantages, many of
the smaller and inefficient independent refineries
succumbed to competitive pressures.
A change in gasoline consumption in the early
1980s also induced reductions in refinery capac-
ity. The sharp increase in crude oil prices in
1979-80 caused world oil consumption to fall.
Between 1980 and 1983, world consumption fell
by 2 million barrels per day. The drop in de-
mand, coupled with high crude oil prices,
drastically reduced refinery profit margins, and
forced many of the refineries to close. For exam~
pie, in the United States the number of refineries
dropped from 303 in 1981 to 182 in 1987.
In recent years, lower oil prices and world eco-
nomic growth have caused consumption to rise.
World oil demand has risen by 1.4 percent per
year since 1983, when consumption bottomed
out, and consumption is now above the 1981
level.
As shown in Chart 2, refiners have responded to
rising consumption by increasing capacity utiliz-
ation. Since late 1986, production has risen by
nearly a million barrels per day. However, refin-
ery capacity has not risen as rapidly, rising only
600,000 barrels per day over the same period.
Rising consumption and diminished operable ca-
pacity have worked to tighten capacity utilization
in U.S. refining. For example, capacity utilization
in the United States ran at 86.5 percent in Au-
gust, nearly the highest rate in the 1980s.
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This high level of capacity utilization means that
slack capacity is not available, and refiners did
not feel pressure to drop product prices for many
of their products as crude oil prices declined in
1988. Notably, it has been primarily those prod-ucts that face competition from close substitutes
(such as fuel oil, which competes directly with
natural gas) that have led price reductions. In
contrast, those that face inelastic demands (motor
gasoline and home heating oil) have experienced
little downward price pressure.
Changes in market structure
In addition to tightening supply conditions, the
structure of the market has changed in ways that
seem to have reduced competitive pressures on
retail prices. In recent years, the domestic indus-
try has become more concentrated because of
two primary forces. First, oil price decontrol re-
duced the number of independent suppliers and
led to a concentration of production in the larger
refiners.
Second, recent mergers and acquisitions within
the industry have tended to reduce direct com-
petition among refiners as well. Attempts to
restructure debt associated with these mergers of
large oil companies have led those companies to
spin off operations, selling refining or retailing
networks to other companies. In the process, the
major oil companies have tended to become
more regional in focus, concentrating their mar-
keting and distribution in the markets where they
face less competition. As a consequence of this
regionalization, individual markets often have
fewer suppliers, increasing the market power of
the remaining participants.
High fixed costs of capacity
The growing ability of refiners to keep gasoline
prices high in the face of falling crude oil prices
rests firmly on the high fixed cost of building
new refining capacity, which serves as a barrier
to entering the refining industry. New refining ca-
pacity is simply very expensive and takes years
to bring on line.
Upgrading facilities to boost efficiency at existing
refineries can yield some increased capacity, but
those gains are relatively small. Moreover, idled
facilities have been converted to other uses or
mothballed. Those facilities generally had ob-
solete technology and were too small to capture
the cost savings from economies of scale anyway.
For these reasons, capacity utilization is likely to
tighten until margins become so excessive that
new ventures become worthwhile. Even then, it
will take a number of years for such investments
to increase supply and competition within the
market. Currently-planned additions to capacity
are not likely to dilute the market power of refin-
ing companies, however; new capacity is being
brought on line by the companies with the larg-
est current shares of the market. And although
margins are higher in recent years, gasoline
prices still are relatively low, encouraging con-
tinued growth in consumption. Consequently,
refinery price-setting power is likely to get
stronger in the near term, rather than weaker.
A change in pricing strategy
Prices in the gasoline market increasingly will re-
flect local demand conditions. With a drop in
competitive pressure, oil companies are better
able to set prices on the basis of the effect of
those prices on revenues. This is in contrast to
the simple mark-up over input costs that deter-
mined prices in the past. Because the demand for
gasoline is very insensitive to small changes in
retail prices, refiners will be able to maintain
higher margins.
In the near term, retail gasoline prices are likely
to adjust to changes in crude oil prices more
slowly than in the past. Declining consumption
of gasoline during the winter months will work to
hold down further increases in prices, but re-
finers will be able to reduce gasoline production
and shift to heating oil without generating slack
capacity that might put downward pressure on
prices.
Over the longer-term, domestic oil companies
and oil exporting countries alike will respond to
growing capacity shortages by expanding their
downstream refinery operations. This should
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